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Lee, Choi, Park, and Jang: The Management of Laboratory Biological Safety in Korea
Communication

J Bacteriol Virol 2014;44(4):342-351.

Published online: 9 February 2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.4167/jbv.2014.44.4.342

The Management of Laboratory Biological Safety in Korea

Kyung-Min Lee1, 3, Yeon-Joo Choi1, 2, Kyung-Hee Park1, Won-Jong Jang1, 2, *

1Department of Microbiology, College of Medicine, Konkuk University, Seoul, Korea

2Institute of Glocal Disease Control, Konkuk University, Seoul, Korea

3Internationl Vaccine Institute, Seoul, Korea

*Corresponding author: Won-Jong Jang. Department of Microbiology, College of Medicine, Konkuk University, 120 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul, 143-701, Korea. Phone: +82-2-2030-7816, Fax: +82-2-2030-7845, e-mail: wjjang@kku.ac.kr

Received 15 September 201420 October 2014       Accepted 11 November 2014

Copyright © 2014 Journal of Bacteriology and Virology

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

The Laboratories engaging with microorganisms have some potential risks, depending on handling of pathogens. The safety management system to extend recognition of biosafety and biosecurity needs to be established and practiced in order to prevent hazard possibility and secure safety of researchers who deal with pathogen. As the importance and regulation of global biosafety and biosecurity tended to be intensified, various laws and institutions for the security of biosafety were established when the Act on implementation of Living Modified Organisms, an implantation act of Cartagena was enforced in Korea in 2008. In particular, the system of permission report for Living Modified Organism (LMO), Highly Dangerous Pathogens (HDPs) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), in order to prevent intended or non-intended leakage and occurrence of biohazard derived from pathogen and infectious substance and safely use them. The bioterrorism can be controlled and autonomous management of biosafety by agencies that handle pathogens can be also secured by practicing the various laws and institutions.

Keywords: Biosafety, Biosecurity, Infectious substance, Living modified organism, Highly dangerous pathogens, Biological weapons convention

REFERENCES

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Figure 1.
Import procedures of the biological weapons convention and toxin
jbv-44-342f1.tif
Table 1.
Summary of recommended biosafety level (BL)a
Risk level Biosafety level Laboratory practices Safety equipment and facilitues
1 BL1 • Standard microbiological practices

  • No primary barriers required.

  • PPE: Laboratory coats and gloves; eye, face protection, as needed

  • Laboratory bench and sink required
2 BL2

  • BL-1 practice plus:

    • - Limited access

    • - Biohazard signs

    • - Sharps precautions

    • - Biosafety manual defining any needed waste decontamination or medical surveillance policies

  • Primary barriers:

    • - BSCb or other physical containment devices used for all manipulations of agents that cause splashes or aerosols of infectious materials

    • - PPE: Laboratory coats, gloves, face and eye protection, as needed

  • BL-1 plus: Autoclave available
3 BL3

  • BL-2 practice plus:

    • - Controlled access

    • - Decontamination of all waste

    • - Decontamination of laboratory clothing before laundering

  • Primary barriers:

    • - BSCb or other physical containment devices used for all open manipulations of agents

    • - PPE: Protective laboratory clothing, gloves, face, eye and respiratory protection, as needed

  • BL-2 plus:

    • - Physical separation from access corridors

    • - Self-closing, double-door access

    • - Exhausted air not recirculated

    • - Negative airflow into laboratory

    • - Entry through airlock or anteroom
4 BL4

  • BL-3 practices plus:

    • - Clothing change before entering

    • - Shower on exit

    • - All material decontaminated on exit from facility

  • Primary barriers:

    • - All procedures conducted in Class III BSCb or Class I or II BSCb in combination with full-body, air-supplied, positive pressure suit

  • BL-3 plus:

    • - Separate building or isolated zone

    • - Dedicated supply and exhaust, vacuum, and decontamination systems

a Modified from Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 5th ed. (11–13).

b BSC: Biological safety cabinet

Table 2.
The reporting obligation as and living modified organisms and facility
Classification Submission Type
Imports and exports of LMOa Recognition of state in the LMO for experimental & research KCDCb Approval
LMO for experimental & research MSIPc Declaration
BL1, 2 for human health risk
BL1, 2 for environmental health risk		 MSIPc
Central administrative agency concerned		 Declaration
Facility for LMOa BL3, 4 for human health risk KCDCb Permission
BL3, 4 for environmental health risk MSIPc Permission
LMO of High-risk to human health KCDCb Approval
Development and experimental of LMOa Reserch for release into the environment, etc. MSIPc
Central administrative agency concerned		 Approval

a LMO: Living Modified Organisms

b KCDC: Korea Centers for disease Control and Prevention

c MSIP: Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning

Table 3.
General biosafety rule for laboratory usersa
Safety checklist for laboratory users
Limited access
The test operations should be performed in a way that minimizes the amount of aerosol generated
Eating, storing food, smoking, and putting on make-up are not allowed inside the laboratory
The researchers shall perform visual inspections and management activities before starting the tests
Using the dedicated waste container
The autoclave should be checked if they are operating properly each time the operation is initiated using a biological indicator
All operatives should wash their hands when leaving the laboratory
Wash hands after using any substances hazardous to health, on leaving the laboratory
Blades, injection needles, or other sharp objects should be stored in their designated containers
The researchers shall wear proper personal protective equipment while in the laboratory
The researchers shall remove the gloves and lab coats when leaving the laboratory

a Modified from Laboratory biosafety manual, 3rd ed. (12)

Table 4.
The Highly dangerous pathogens in Korea
Bacteria Virus/ Prion
Yersinia pestis Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1, Herpes B virus
Bacillus anthracis Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
Brucella melitencis, Brucella suis Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus
Burkholderia mallei Ebola virus
Burkholderia pseudomallei Hendra virus
Clostridium botulinum Lassa virus
Shigella dysenteriae Type 1 Marbug virus
Chlamydia psittaci Monkeypox virus
Coxiella burnetii Nipah virus
Francisella tularensis Rift Valley fever virus
Rickettsia prowazekii South American HFV, Flexal, Guanarito, Junin, Machupo, Sabia
Rickettsia rickettsii Yellow fever virus
Coccidioides immitis Western equine encephalitis virus
Vibrio cholerae O1 · O139 Tick-borne encephalitis complex virus; Central
European Tick-born encephalitis, Far Eastern
Tick-born encephalitis, Siberian Tick-born encephalitis, Kyasanur Forest disease, Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus
Variola virus
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus
SARS, Corona virus
Avian influenza infection in humans (H5N1, H7N7, H7N9)
Influenza virus (include gene of 1918 influenza virus)
Transmission of spongiform encephalopathy agent; Bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease prion
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