The majority of research on Korean radiological risk perception has to do with research on radiological risk perception and variables affecting risk perception, and research on the relationships among risk perception, risk acceptance, and behavioral intention. According to previous research, Koreans on average have negative attitudes toward nuclear power (36). The attitude of the younger generations has especially changed negatively towards radiation and medical use of radiation after the 2011 Japanese Fukushima nuclear accident (37). The media has a lot to do with this change in attitude. The way the media handles nuclear energy, such as coverage over the Japanese nuclear accident, affects radiological risk perception, and these influences are reinforced and enlarged when they interact with readers’ comments on news articles (38). In a collectivistic society such as Korea, agreeing comments, a socially conformative phenomenon, can rapidly exacerbate the risks catalyzed by the media. This amplified risk perception can result in social stigmatization of nuclear risk.

The stigmatization of nuclear risks affects the overall perception of radiation. According to research on the stigmatization of scientific technology involving risk (39), stigmatization of nuclear energy has a negative influence on risk perception of both radiation technology and products of radiation technology. Unless the stigmatization on radiation itself is alleviated, the effects of radiation communication can only be limited.

With the general negativity of risk perception on radiation and nuclear power, another important result from research on risk perception is the discrepancy in perceptions between laymen and experts. According to research using the co-orientation model that tries to estimate both 1) the agreement of the two sides’ opinions and 2) the accuracy between one side’s estimation of the other’s opinions and the other’s real opinions, there is a stark difference between experts’ radiological risk perception and that of laymen (36) (Table 2). Laymen tend to think more negatively of nuclear energy than nuclear energy experts, and the two do not share most risk perception categories. There was a definite perception discrepancy between laymen and experts in the categories of safety of nuclear energy, possibility of control, and amount of fear. Another result from the research on co-orientation is that people’s estimate of the other side’s perception (A’s actual perception and B’s estimate of A’s perception) is statistically inaccurate. This low accuracy is worrisome since this implies that experts and laymen cannot anticipate each other’s thoughts.

Laymen and experts also view the nuclear energy communication situation differently. Laymen are less confident in the effect of nuclear energy communication than experts are. However, when it comes to perceptions of nuclear energy communication, both laymen and experts are acutely aware of each other’s perception of nuclear energy communication. This shows that improvement is possible since laymen and experts understand each other’s perspective by applying similar risk communication standards. In another study, experts’ perceptions toward radioactively preserved foodstuffs and cancer treatment using radiation were more positive and risk-accepting than laymen’s (40).

Furthermore, perceptions of nuclear energy affect acceptance of nuclear and radiological risks. Koreans’ acceptance of nuclear and radiological risks is affected by the level of trust in nuclear power plants, amount of risk perceived from nuclear energy, and the amount of benefits felt coming from nuclear energy (41). There are many variables affecting risk perception and risk acceptance, but the variable deserving the most attention recently is emotion. For residents in areas near nuclear power plants, their experiences living near the realities of nuclear risks and the emotions these experiences produce affect residents’ perspectives towards potential benefits and risks and residents’ acceptance towards risk (42). This shows that the perception towards nuclear and radiological risks is determined by how the public’s emotions are handled.

According to research on the frames of radiation messages, message frames had no effect on messages about cancer treatment using radiation but were effective with messages about radioactively preserved foodstuffs to some extent. In general, laymen perceived risks more than experts, but when discussing the benefits of radioactively preserved foodstuffs (Fig. 1), laymen exposed to a benefit/positive frame appreciated the foodstuffs more than those exposed to a loss/negative frame. On the other hand, experts exposed to a loss/negative frame appreciated the foodstuffs more than their counterparts who were exposed to a benefit/positive frame (40). These results are different from that of foreign research (which say that for promoting radioactively preserved foodstuffs positive messages are effective and for cancer treatment using radiation, negative messages), but these Korean results not only consider the effects of message frames but also take into calculation the expertise of the audience and suggest that certain message frames can be more effective when paired with audiences of certain expertise.

Koreans feel more comfortable toward cancer treatment using radiation than radioactively preserved foodstuffs and feel that the former is more necessary than the latter (40). This trend was more pronounced in laymen than in experts (Fig. 2). Laymen were more avoidant of both radioactively preserved foodstuffs and cancer treatment using radiation than experts, but the difference in perception became much smaller in the case of cancer treatment using radiation. This phenomenon also appeared when measuring acceptance of risk. Laymen are thought to be more familiar with and more acceptive of cancer treatment using radiation than radioactively preserved foodstuffs since cancer treatment is directly connected to survival and therefore, the radiological risk coming from such treatment is acceptable. However, radioactively preserved foodstuffs are avoided if possible and thought not worth the risk. These results show that subjective judgments of risk affect subsequent perceptions and action variables.

Interaction between media forms and message frames affects risk perception and purchase intention for radioactively preserved foodstuffs (43). When delivering information using text and video, using positive message frames reduced risk perception and using negative frames increased risk perception. However, when using sound to deliver information, the results using positive frames did not differ from results using negative frames. This shows that the type of message frame used is not the sole variable. Different outcomes can come about by using different types of media. Therefore, not only the composition of the message but also the medium of the message is important when communication campaigns are designed.

Media frames on radiation are generally negative. Analysis on media coverage of the heavy water leakage accident in the Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 in 1999 shows that the media exaggerated the accident and raised baseless anxieties (44). Another problem with Korean media is that most coverage on accidents are sensational and have no interest in analyzing fundamental causes, in controlling processes nor in the execution of safety contingency plans.

The problem with Korean media coverage on radiation is that it is biased, especially after the Japanese Fukushima nuclear accident. The media is merely at the stage of exaggerating risk frames and delivering information on accidents. The media is incapable of producing future-oriented coverages while it focuses on political interpretations (454647). It also turns out that press ideologies of Korean media companies affect the media frames concerning nuclear energy (48). Furthermore, when covering the construction of nuclear waste disposal facilities in Buan and Gyeongju, the media reproduced and enlarged social conflict and anxiety rather than encourage active risk communication among stakeholders (49). Media coverage on radiation needs to change. Its foundations lie on distrust. It should change and start to restore trust among social participants by allowing public participation. However, contemporary Korean coverage on radiation is incapable of such a productive role.

It is important to provide a socially open and rational public sphere in order to facilitate a correct perception of radiological risk. However, with regards to radiological risk, there are many cases in which public opinion makes a judgment even before rational communication is given a chance. The influence media coverage can have on radiation is sizeable. The reason media coverage on radiation is important is that nuclear stigmatization through media affects perceptions on both radiological risk and radiation technology (39). Perceptions of radiation are hard to reset once they turn sour. Therefore, it is important to provide balanced information on radiation before radiation is stigmatized.

However, it is true that people already think negatively of radiation (50). The public’s risk perception of nuclear energy is based not on any specific facts but by impressions given by radiation (3). The public, which has witnessed the Fukushima nuclear accident nearby via the media, perceives the dangers of radiation greatly (51). Because negative impressions of radiation are subjectively formed, a couple of arguments against such an attitude will not change anything.

Then what communication strategy would ensure that the public has a balanced view of radiation? When scientific technology is presented as part of the solution to the public’s problem, communication about scientific technology becomes more effective (3). If the public feels as though it is deeply connected to radiation issues, for example, if the public feels as though technologies using radiation are closely connected to everyday life, the public, which only thought negatively of radiation, will start to look at it in a comprehensive light. Therefore, in order for the public to consider both the positive and negative sides of radiation, it must be shown that radiation has a place in everyday life. This means going beyond both the society-oriented discussions and abstractness the media has provided and pursuing a more personal and specific approach to solve radiation problems.

If one observes reactions to communication covering radioactively contaminated foodstuffs, negative messages gathered a large amount of public confidence when targeted at people distrustful of the government (52). Furthermore, the more people debated about public issues, processed information about radioactively contaminated foodstuffs or felt ignorant about radioactively contaminated foodstuffs, the more their distrust of the government increased. These results show that social distrust is one of the biggest obstacles in solving the radiation problem.

This general distrust towards the government’s risk communication also directly affects nuclear and radiological risk perceptions. When looking at previous research comparing Korean responses to the Chernobyl nuclear accident and the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Chernobyl accident did not lead to people pointing out nuclear risks within Korea while Fukushima did (1). Not only was the public worried by the close vicinity of a Japanese nuclear crisis, but they were also aware of its government’s apparent lack of ability to manage crises, having experienced the government’s ineptitudes several times beforehand. In other words, realizations that nuclear disasters might happen during their daily lives and doubt of the government’s ability has incited people’s anxiety of nuclear power and radiation. Therefore, communication that can reduce the public’s distrust of the government and other related public agencies is required to curtail the public’s anxiety of nuclear and radiological risks.

The most important form of radiation-related communication is communication which alleviates distrust. This kind of communication must ensure public participation in decision making processes concerning radiological risks, must be independent of special interest groups, and, above all, encourage the participation of the public. All communication must be open, and must show fast and transparent resolutions of problems. Organizations responsible for radiological risks must especially show that they are making authentic internal efforts when solving problems. A communication system capable of direct and rapid communication with the public is also necessary. Such systems include crisis communication models for handling crises, dispute systems designs for organizational conflicts, and mutual gain approaches for consensus building (22). Other alternative dispute resolution systems also can be utilized to encourage mutual understanding and public participation (9).

Radiation communication must be preemptive in order to prevent stigmatization. It is hard to recover from stigmatization in Korea. Vocabulary that can bring about groundless fear and misunderstanding must be replaced, and efforts to enlarge mutual understanding with the public must be made through the open and accurate delivery of information, including negative information. Two-sided information is effective in high risk involvement situations. There is also a need to use some expressions more accurately, such as “radioactively exposed foodstuffs” and “nuclear waste dumping facilities (58).” Furthermore, delivering radiation information in advance, thereby using the so-called inoculation effect, can ensure that risk is not easily stigmatized through words of mouth and rumors. Ample discussion is needed to decide which risk message frame is needed during preemptive communication. The effects of risk message frames will change based on the speaker, the situation, the issue, and the public. The best way to predict the effects of a message frame is to put a frame under a simple test and confirm its effects before it is deployed, thereby reducing mistakes and maximizing effects.

Radiation is ultimately linked to the problem of uncertainty and anxiety. To experts and scientists uncertainty is just something to be accepted, but to laymen uncertainty means anxiety. Experts try to control scientific matters, which are all based on some level of uncertainty, but laymen strive for zero uncertainty and want to avoid any amount of uncertainty. Therefore, health risk communication must enable laymen to make reasonable and independent judgments on scientific uncertainty (59).

For example, if the construction of the Gyeongju nuclear waste disposal facility fans anxiety toward earthquake dangers, it is important that laymen participate in decision making processes concerning uncertainty so that they themselves decide the amount of uncertainty they are willing to accept. During these processes, experts must acknowledge the public as a risk interpreting agent and not just an audience. The problem of accepting uncertainty is linked to the scientific belief of acknowledging uncertainty. Therefore, rather than eliminating uncertainty, changing people’s assumptions of science is recommended. According to some research, people who view science as a subject of disputation and feel that some uncertainty is unavoidable turned out to understand and even accept a certain amount of risk (60). Therefore, a radiation communication campaign should be implemented to raise the public’s understanding of science in order to solve the sensitivity problem of uncertainty.

There is a huge divide in perceptions towards radiation between experts and laymen. Experts include medical professionals, researchers, and policy decision makers who specialize in the field of nuclear energy and radiation. To close this divide, experts need to work more on their communication. Experts must have more active dialogue and reciprocal meaning-sharing efforts with laymen in order to change the public’s attitudes on nuclear energy and radiation and to recover trust. Democratized science is needed to deal with radiological risk, and experts must go beyond laboratory knowledge and try to integrate existing knowledge with laymen’s experiential knowledge (59). Another way to close the gap in perceptions between experts and laymen is to use the Mental Models Approach (61). The Mental Models Approach is comprised of four stages: 1) figure out the expert’s normative model, 2) figure out the layman’s descriptive model, 3) diagnose the difference in perceptions using communication models and find the most effective form of communication, and 4) gauge the effect of communication and reinforce it. Closing the difference in perceptions between experts and laymen makes it easier to form public spheres for radiation problems. Public spheres provide people a place or area to freely discuss social problems and to form public opinions through participatory democracy (22).

Laymen’s perception of radiation is normally encountered via the media. Therefore, it is important for the media not to arbitrarily interpret uncertainty when covering radiation and not to focus on sensational aspects of radiological risks. When the media does interpret uncertainty arbitrarily, it focuses on disproportionate exemplification or anxiety. This attention-grabbing form of coverage manipulates people’s risk perceptions (62). Furthermore, people’s perceptions of risk and attitudes on science change depending on what media frame and what sources the media is using (63). If the media does not change its reporting orientation, establishing an effective public sphere for radiological risks will be difficult, and it will be very challenging to have sound debates. The media must publish fair coverage that relies on facts and not on sensationalism (44). Reporting guidelines for nuclear energy and radiation should be established and complied by reporters. Furthermore, regular opportunities for educating science reporters should be prepared by nuclear-related institutions to enhance reporters’ general knowledge of nuclear energy and radiation. Another necessity for bringing about change in media coverage is related to a complete revelation of information by nuclear energy management agencies. Media coverage will be based on assumptions or biases if complete information is not disclosed. Furthermore, there is a need for enacting a universal self-regulating media coverage ethics to ensure that media coverage be made in an increasingly ethical manner. It is important to form a reasonable public sphere for nuclear energy and radiation by integrating complete revelation of information and conformity to the ethical norms of media coverage.

However, in order to create a rational public sphere, not only changes to nuclear energy management agencies’ communication paradigms and active effort are required, but educating the public about the basic principles of nuclear energy and radiation is also necessary (37). Various means of communication must be mobilized. Examples are online and offline science cafés where experts and laymen would be able to discuss, and even solve, problems together, and utilize media, events, seminars, online classes, SNSs, and anything else capable of educating people on the elementary principles of nuclear energy and radiation. Without knowing the fundamentals of radiation such as half-life, amounts of exposure, and measurement units of nuclear energy, people will feel vaguely anxious, their self-esteem will fall, and they will very likely adopt a fatalistic view. Scientific education that media and public campaigns can provide is vital in stopping this from happening. The forms of media campaigns include all kinds of strategic communication campaigns such as social marketing, advertising, and public relations campaigns.

The recent MERS incident showed that during a crisis, medical knowledge alone is insufficient to calm the anxieties of the public. This lesson can be brought to nuclear crises. In order to assuage the fears of the public, expert medical knowledge must be explained in a way easily understood by the public. Efforts must also be made to gain the public’s understanding. Since crisis communication assumes that uncertainty exists, forming consensuses through communication and gaining understanding are essential (9). On both accounts, cooperation between medical professionals and communication experts must be considered due to the need to deliver expert medical knowledge in a format comfortably approached by the public and the need to establish a cooperation system by gaining the understanding of the public. In order to format medical knowledge, preparatory efforts must be made to make messages in advance. These messages should consider appropriate risk comparisons, effective message framing, and efficient message deliverance methods by diverse media types. If a message has to be constructed once a crisis has already initiated, chances are that the efforts to construct such a message will worsen the situation (23). Such message mappings must be conducted before crises arise and through an intimate and regular cooperation system between medical professionals and communication experts. The second most important agenda is to estalblish a system that ensures the public’s cooperation. Modern risk problems cannot be solved solely by medical professionals. A social system able to ensure the public’s cooperation through information disclosure is needed. When a crisis occurs, medical professionals and communication experts must cooperate to form a public sphere in which the public can also participate. It is also imperative to establish a cooperation system in which all aspects of society can contribute to rationally overcome the current crisis. Furthermore, this problem is naturally linked to the issue of establishing social crisis management systems.

Nuclear energy and radiation issues inevitably cause crises. How an entity responsible for managing risk will communicate with the public during a crisis is an important communication issue. A key principle during a crisis is to deliver accurate information to the public as promptly as possible (22). Nuclear energy management agencies and governments have a duty to provide consistency in presented content by providing authentic information during a crisis. Superficial communication on symptoms and consequences during a radiological accident will only intensify public distrust. When an accident occurs, it is important to provide profound analyses and diagnoses following the Onion Model widely used in the field of crisis management. The Onion Model explains that technical accidents are associated with problems coming from the structure, personnel, and culture of an organization, not from seemingly technical malfunctions. The crisis should be analyzed in a multifacet and in-depth way to find out the authentic reason.

Furthermore, when looked at in detail, these problems are also linked to the organization’s management philosophy and the ideology of the organization’s leadership. Therefore, crisis communication which focuses only on technical problems will not gain the public’s trust. It is important to assure the public that a similar accident will never happen again through profound investigations into the causes of the crisis. Relying on presentations of temporary solutions without providing trustworthy explanations about corrective actions will only increase distrust towards nuclear energy and radiation. Health risk communication concerning radiation can restore the public’s trust gradually when open and preemptive communication aimed at prevention is combined with proper responses and effective crisis communication during crises.